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Abstract—The design of wireless systems for Mission Critical
Machine Type Communication (MC-MTC) is currently a hot
research topic. Wireless systems are considered to provide nu-
merous advantages over wired systems in industrial applications
for example. However, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless
channel, such systems are prone to a wide range of cyber attacks.
These range from passive eavesdropping attacks to active attacks
like data manipulation or masquerade attacks. Therefore it is
necessary to provide reliable and efficient security mechanisms.
One of the most important security issue in such a system is to
ensure integrity as well as authenticity of exchanged messages
over the air between communicating devices in order to prohibit
active attacks. In the present work, an approach on how to
achieve this goal in MC-MTC systems based on Physical Layer
Security (PHYSEC), especially a new method based on keeping
track of channel variations, will be presented and a proof-of-
concept evaluation is given.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication systems have a lot of advantages
compared to wired communication systems, especially in
industrial environments. These are, for example, higher
flexibility, lower cost in manufacturing and maintenance as
well as the enabling of new applications in the context of the
ongoing fourth industrial revolution. On the other hand the
wireless nature of the underlying channel provides a huge
potential for diverse attacks. Every possible participant inside
the coverage of the system is able to passively and actively
interact with the transmitted information and consequently
able to interact with the served applications as well. In this
work, a promising approach on how to secure such a system
in an efficient way based on PHYSEC is presented.
Regarding the type of communication considered in this work,
which is MC-MTC, closed loop control applications might
be a possible use case. For this instance, primarily the safe
and secure operation of the controlled machines or processes
and secondly the nondisclosure of intellectual property such
as process control parameters, machine configuration data
or even simple information such as the production volume
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of controlled processes have to be ensured. Due to security
flaws in today commonly applied protocols and systems in
industrial scenarios, it is essential for future systems to provide
adequate security measures which rely on both, conventional
cryptography, as well as consideration of physical conditions
of the present environment. A typical scenario for an attacker
in such a system could be that he is located outside of
a factory environment using advanced equipment such as
directed antennas and high sensitivity receivers to maximize
the range of the attacked system to his benefit (see Fig.
1), as well as appropriate computational power and perfect
knowledge of the underlying communication protocol to
accomplish passive and active attacks. In the case of passive
attacks, eavesdropping and traffic analysis are considered and
for the case of active attacks, replay attacks and masquerade
attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks or address spoofing
are considered. It is not assumed that the attacker is gaining
physical access to the environment of the deployed system to
accomplish invasive attacks such as hardware modification.
Further, Denial-of-Service attacks due to jamming are not
considered as well. It is assumed, that legal communicating
participants have already carried out initial user authentication
to each other and have set up initial trust in a secure way.
Fig. 1: System and Attacker Model
In order to prevent and detect the mentioned scenarios
of possible attacks, suitable security measures have to be
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applied. Even though this can be provided by means of
conventional security techniques, these techniques also bring
some disadvantages with them, for example the additional
overhead introduced by message integrity check codes to
ensure message integrity and authenticity, which is also the
goal of this work. Therefore, we propose an approach based on
PHYSEC in our work, which ensures this in an efficient way
based on so called Channel Profile Monitoring (CPM). The
main idea is to exploit characteristics of the wireless channel
in time and spatial domain. As mentioned, MC-MTC and
closed loop control applications are considered here, which
in combination seems to be a perfect case for our approach,
as we can assume that frequent and periodic data transmissions
and with this channel estimation at the same rate (e.g. once
per ms) is carried out.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. In
section II we give a short overview on related work with
respect to previous considered approaches and in section III
our approach on how to fulfill the above mentioned security
objectives regarding active attacks based on PHYSEC is
introduced. In section IV we give insight in first results of
our work and section V finally concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, several approaches on exploiting the wire-
less channel for security purposes, also known as PHYSEC,
have been investigated. Many works have focused on extract-
ing secret keys between two communicating devices, such
as [1], [2], [3]. The focus of our work is on guaranteeing
secure transmission with respect to integrity and authenticity
of data packets from one device to another, which has also
been considered in a couple of recent works. For example
in [4] an approach based on channel measurements and
hypothesis testing is presented for static scenarios and later in
[5] extended to time-variant scenarios. Though the results of
these works are plausible, they are obtained from simulations
of the wireless channel only. Therefore, in our work we will
focus on real world channels. In [6] two approaches based on
machine learning, Support Vector Machine and Linear Fisher
Discriminant Analysis, are presented. A Gaussian Mixture
Model based technique is applied in [7]. The approach con-
sidered in [8] is similar to our approach, as they propose a
CSI-based authentication method. However, they consider a
single carrier system, while we will focus on a multi carrier
system for evaluation later in section IV. The second approach
considered in [8] is whiteness of residuals testing. In [9] an
RSS-based approach for body area networks is presented. The
work in [10] considers a multilayer approach based on OFDM
to guarantee authentication of TCP packets.
III. CHANNEL PROFILE MONITORING FOR MC-MTC
In this section we describe how to protect MC-MTC from
the active attacks mentioned in section I by exploiting PHY-
SEC techniques, actually Channel Profile Monitoring based on
frequent channel measurements.
A. Drawbacks of MIC for MC-MTC
In commonly deployed systems for industrial applications
such as IEEE 802.15.4 based systems, integrity checking of
MAC (media access control layer) payload is provided in form
of message authentication codes (MAC, to not confuse with
these abbreviations, in the following MIC is used to refer to
message integrity checking based on message authentication
codes and MAC is used to refer to media access control layer).
These calculate a check sum which is added to the the actual
MAC payload. In IEEE 802.15.4 based systems either a 4, 8
or 16 Byte MIC sum is added to the respective payload. This
leads to an overhead for the MAC payload on data frames of
at least 3.54% if 4 Byte MIC is considered as shown in Tab.I
(without any other MAC overhead such as header or footer
and if maximum MAC payload size is considered). In our
work we assume that the payload of a MC-MTC packet has
a length of 40 Byte. The dimension of this assumption is e.g.
confirmed by [11]. Then the payload overhead regarding the
shortest possible MIC size of 4 Byte would be already 10%.
Consequently the application of MIC sums seems to be not
appropriate for this use case. Another important issue is that
only the MAC payload of messages is secured. An attacker
can e.g. still manipulate Bits in the MAC header to fake the
source ID of the message or even worse unset security options.
TABLE I: MIC overhead for IEEE 802.15.4 and considered
MC-MTC (size of MIC and MAC payload given in Byte)
System MIC size MAC payload MIC overhead
IEEE 802.15.4 4 113 3.54%
IEEE 802.15.4 8 113 7.08%
IEEE 802.15.4 16 113 14.16%
MC-MTC 4 40 10%
MC-MTC 8 40 20%
MC-MTC 16 40 40%
B. New Approach based on Channel Profile Monitoring
Due to these drawbacks of MIC sum based integrity check-
ing, a more promising approach is to monitor the channel pro-
file by taking frequent channel measurements into account. In
contrast to PHYSEC techniques such as secret key generation,
which is based on the assumption that there is a lot of temporal
variation in a wireless channel, our approach relies on the fact
that the wireless channel does not vary significantly during
subsequent channel measurements. However, the same idea
that yields for both is to make use of the advantage of the
fast spatial decorrelation of wireless channels. For CPM in
particular, this means, that e.g. Alice receives packets from
the legal transmit node Bob and estimates the actual channel
conditions H(k)AB . The idea is now to compare the channel
measurement which is experienced by Alice during reception
of a packet from Bob at time k to the channel measurement
of the previous reception at time k−1 and calculate the mean
square error (MSE)
e
(k)
AB = MSE(H
(k)
AB , H
(k−1)
AB ) (1)
with
MSE(X,Y) =
1
LM
L∑
i=0
M∑
j=0
(Xi,j −Yi,j)2 (2)
of two matrices X and Y of size LxM . If the error e(k)AB
is now below a certain threshold eth, Alice assumes that
there has been no manipulation attack performed on that
packet and that it was send by the legal transmitter node Bob
yielding e(k)AB < eth. This is based on the mentioned assump-
tion that between two subsequent receptions from one trans-
mitter the channel is considered as approximately constant
(H(k)AB ≈ H(k−1)AB ), i.e. these two subsequent measurements lie
within the coherence time of the channel.
If now an attacker Eve tries to manipulate Bobs transmissions
or insert packets to masquerade as Bob, the channel profile
measured by Alice differs at a much higher degree so that
H
(k)
AE 6= H(k−1)AB and consequently e(k)AE ≥ eth > e(k)AB . Due
to the distance between the attacker node Eve and the legal
transmitter node Bob, Eve is not able to masquerade without
further effort due to the mentioned fast spatial decorrelation
property of the channel. As a result of this, a receiver node
will deal with a received packet as follows after calculating
the error e(k) at time k:
Receive packet
{
process it, if e(k) < eth
drop it, if e(k) ≥ eth (3)
IV. INITIAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we give insight in first existing results of
our work. To evaluate our concepts, we use USRP N210
SDR platforms from Ettus Research with SBX daughterboards.
We use GNURadio OFDM transmitter and receiver blocks
to process data packets and perform channel estimation on
each received data packet. A setup with an FFT size of 64 is
considered and 48 data subcarriers. The cyclic prefix length is
16 samples at a baseband sample rate of 3.125 MSps, whereas
the carrier frequency is 2.45 GHz. For each received data
packet, the initial channel taps are calculated based on the
known Schmidl and Cox preamble [12] which is also used
to calculate the coarse frequency offset. Each known symbol
is followed by 4 data symbols yielding a time resolution of
128 µs for the channel measurements. As a first step, we
consider a static setup where all participants do not move
during transmitting and receiving.
We now calculate the elements of the error vectors eAB and
eAE as
e
(k)
AB = MSE(h
(k)
AB , h
(k−1)
AB ) (4)
and
e
(k)
AE = MSE(h
(k)
AE , h
(k−1)
AB ) (5)
with h(k)AB and h
(k)
AE being the channel taps in frequency
domain of size 1xM , with M = 64, derived by Alice at time
k due to Bob and Eve respectively and k = 1, . . . , N . Fig. 2a
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Fig. 2: Setup with Bob and Eve at the same location
shows the error vectors eAB (MSE Bob) and eAE (MSE Eve)
with Bob and Eve as transmitters located at the same place
and Alice as the receiver exemplary. The distance between
Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve is dAB = dAE = 3 m in all
setups. The MSE is within the same range for both transmitters
and they can obviously not be distinguished from each other
based on that information. The same counts for the Pearson
Correlation Coefficient (PCC) which is shown additionally
and also indicates high similarity for both considered cases.
However, the setup with Bob and Eve at different locations
(Fig. 3) yields a different result. Fig. 3a shows the set of
reference measurements that is obtained in order to deter-
mine the decision threshold eth. Though Eve is located only
dBE = 10 cm away from Bob in this setup, they can clearly
be distinguished in case of MSE (Fig. 3a). In case of PCC
(Fig. 3b) there is still a huge amount of indistinguishable
errors. With a measurement setup of N = 10000 conducted
measurements each time we get an average packet drop rate of
0% for received packets from the benign transmitter Bob in the
setup with same transmitter locations of Bob and Eve and an
average packet drop rate of 6.37% for received packets from
the malicious transmitter Eve. This confirms the presumption
made based on observation of Fig. 2. In the setup with the
transmitters at different locations we get an average packet
drop rate of 0% for Bob and an average packet drop rate of
97, 28% for Alice transmitting. The decision threshold eth is as
mentioned chosen from the reference measurement set shown
in Fig. 3a and used for all measurement sets. It is calculated
as
eth =
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
k=1
e
(k)
ABref
− 1
N
N∑
k=1
e
(k)
AEref
∣∣∣∣∣ (6)
with eABref and eAEref being the error vectors of the refer-
ence measurement set.
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Fig. 3: Setup with Bob and Eve at different locations
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown a promising approach on how to secure
MC-MTC by means of PHYSEC, actually Channel Profile
Monitoring (CPM), in a very efficient way. The combination
of both, MC-MTC and CPM is essential considering system
efficiency, as both rely on frequent transmission of data packets
and with this also channel estimation. We can reuse channel
estimations and make decisions on integrity and authenticity
of received data packets with little to no further effort. For
a more reliable evaluation of our setup, the application of
further evaluation approaches shown in section II is essential.
Especially machine learning approaches seem interesting to
us. The finding of a decision threshold has to be considered
and optimized further as well. Especially the packet drop rate
for Eve of 97.28% at a different location is still to low to
be considered as reliable. However, for Bob the packet drop
rate was always 0% in that case. Additionally we also want
to focus on a mobile setup with little to moderate velocities.
We have assumed here that communicating nodes have already
carried out initial authentication, which to achieve is another
issue and needs to be considered as well in future work.
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